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Unit Determination and the Problem of
Craft Severance
C ONGRESS through the Wagner Act' sought to promote stability
in industrial relations by creating for industry's employees a
quantum of rights incident to the collective bargaining process.
The most significant feature of this Act and its subsequent amend-
ments is that a compromise, albeit an uneasy truce, was effectuated
between the competing interests of labor and management.2  Un-
fortunately, the administration of this -basic policy of compromise
has caused both sides to sometimes lose sight of the Act's declared
objective.
This is truest in the area of unit determination where manage-
ment generally favors a plantwide unit for the simple reason that it
is easier to contend with one union, rather than a number of unions,
at the bargaining table, while organized labor, particularly the
American Federation of Labor, has championed separate representa-
tion of each identifiable skilled and semiskilled group of employees.
Of course, this is an oversimplification because the unions them-
selves often become embroiled in deadly conflict over the question
of representation within the plantwide unit. Nowhere is this strug-
gle better manifested than in the field of craft severance where two
unions fight for the allegiance of workers who, because of their spe-
cialized skills, attempt disassociation from the larger plantwide unit
and seek inclusion in a smaller craft unit. This problem of craft sev-
erance is by no means a creature of recent origin.' However, the
immediacy of the problem has been accentuated by the proliferation
of skills and trades in the postwar years and the increased sophistica-
tion of manufacturing methods which calls for the services of skilled
employees.
The National Labor Relations Board, in whose discretion the
problem of unit determination has been posited, has recently re-
evaluated its standards in deciding questions of craft severance, but
in so doing may have opened the door to a myriad of additional
complications. It is the purpose of this Note to review the back-
ground of this problem, to relate the law as it now stands, and, fi-
INational Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88
(1964) [hereinafter cited as NLRA].
2 See generally P. TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1964).
3 See generally H. HARRIS, LABOR'S CML WAR (Ist ed. 1940).
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nally, to offer suggestions for a solution which both recognizes the
conflicting interests of labor and management, and, at the same
time, promotes general industrial stability which, as in all situations
falling within the purview of the Act, is the end to ,be served in
craft severance cases.
I. HISTORY OF CRAFT SEVERANCE
A. Congressional Intent
To grasp and appreciate the complex, and sometimes compet-
ing, rationales employed in craft severance cases it is necessary to
review briefly the legislative background of unit determination in
general. Through section 9(a)4 of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) Congress granted to the appropriate bargaining unit
the exclusive right to represent all members of that unit. Then, in
section 9(b), it was provided that the National Labor Relations
Board should:
Decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees thefull benefit of their right to self organization and to collective bar-
gaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act, the
unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.5
Section 9(b), while thus manifesting congressional concern for
employee free choice and the appropriateness of the unit selected, is
devoid of any instructive guidelines and, instead, leaves the deter-
mination of bargaining units to the Board's discretion.' This re-
sult is laudable in that it insures administrative flexibility, but it
has also caused problems, confusion, and with each shift in the
Board's position, has brought criticism. Specifically, the difficulty
inherent in the section 9(b) mandate is reconciling employee free
choice with the selection of a unit deemed appropriate for collective
bargaining purposes. If absolute free choice were sanctioned then
it would follow that every identifiable group of employees could
designate its own unit. Clearly, such a policy, if realized, would
lead to chaos because it would place the employer in the unfavor-
able position of dealing with any number of employee representa-
449 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
5 NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964)(emphasis added).
6 Not only did Congress avoid giving any touchstones to be followed in severance
cases, but unit determination questions are also not reviewable by the federal courts be-
cause their jurisdiction extends only to "final orders" and a unit determination is not
such an order. See Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945); NLRB
v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453 (1940); AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
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tives at the bargaining table. The probability of reaching a consen-
sus of agreement would become a mere possibility. Likewise, such
a policy would lead to a sort of "open season" for rival unions
competing for the allegiance of a plant's workers. Therefore, it
does not appear realistic that this freedom of choice should be with-
out some reasonable limitations if the NLRA's raison d'etre, indus-
trial relations stability, is to be attained. The question arises
whether Congress really meant what it said.
In fairness to the promulgators of the N-LRA several points
should be emphasized which provide at least a partial answer to the
apparent conflict between the purpose of the Act and section 9(b).
First, section 9(a) provides for exclusive representation which fore-
closes the possibility of a minority of dissident employees seeking a
bargaining representative different from the one chosen by the ma-
jority.' Second, the Board is to determine the appropriate unit'
"for purposes of collective bargaining" and it would be only rea-
sonable to anticipate that factors other than an unfettered right of
employee free choice would be deemed relevant in making such a
determination.0 Third, in 1935, the American Federation of La-
bor (AFL) appeared to be a fairly cohesive body and the self-
restraint exercised by it probably was expected to neutralize rival,
interunion organizing campaigns. 1 Only in the latter half of the
decade, with the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions (CIO) and that federation's gradual split with the AFL, did
the realities of the kind of interunion warfare that arises in craft
severance cases become commonplace. 2 In fact, the original split
729 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
SFor an interpretation of "appropriate" unit consider the following:
There is nothing in the statute which requires that the unit for bargaining be
the only appropriate unit, or the ultimate unit, or the most appropriate unit,
the Act requires only that the unit be "appropriate." It must be appropriate
to ensure to employees, in each case, "the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by this Act." Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409,
418 (1950) (footnotes omitted).
ONLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
1o Cf. Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance Between Stable
Labor Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 479, 482-83 (1967),
where the author discusses the conflict between sections 9(b) and 9(c) (5), but raises
the same points mentioned in the text accompanying this footnote.
11 See Jones, Self-Determination vs. Stability of Labor Relations, 58 Mict-. L. REv.
313, 313-14 (1960).
12 For an excellent treatment of this subject see H. HAmus, supra note 3. An at-
tempt to settle the dispute among rival unions was made in 1955 and is evidenced by
the AFL-CIO CoNsT. art. XXI, § 2 no-raiding agreement. The circumstances that led
to its adoption are discussed in H. HARMs, supra note 3, at 656-60.
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within the AFL which led to the formation of the CIO was caused
by the former's insistence on craft unit representation and the latter
organization's inability to reconcile this stand with its notion of the
industrial unit.1" Also, several of today's most ambitious unions,
such as the United Auto Workers and the Teamsters, were in their
infancy at the time of the passage of the NLRA."4
Stated briefly, the Congress that drafted and passed the NLRA
did not have reason to foresee the intricate problems of craft sever-
ance.15 Determination of the appropriate bargaining unit was left,
with few guidelines, to the Board and it is that agency that is largely
responsible, with one exception,' 6 for the present standards formu-
lated with respect to craft severance.
B. Development of a Rule by the Board
In 1939, the Board's American Can Co. decision,' the first im-
portant unit severance case, introduced the theory that craft sever-
ance from a larger unit was inappropriate if there had been prior
history of bargaining on a plantwide basis. The Board's position
was that if experience showed that labor-management stability had
been achieved by employee representation on an industrial, plant-
wide pattern, then the status quo would be maintained and the carv-
ing out of smaller bargaining units would be denied. The Ameri-
can Can rule was eventually modified by the Board in International
Minerals & Chemical Corp.'8 wherein the importance of bargaining
13 H. HARMS, supra note 3, at 43. In late 1935 the AFL convention drafted the
following resolution which the CIO, meeting in November of that year, could not ac-
cept: "We consider it our duty . . . to protect the representational rights of all trade
unions organized along craft lines." Id.
14 See P. TAF-r, supra note 2. This work provides the reader with an in-depth his-
tory of the development of these two unions.
15 See Rathbun, The Taft-Hartley Act and Craft Unit Bargaining, 59 YALE L.J.
1023 (1950).
[Ilt should be noted that the 74th Congress was not aware when it wrote the
Wagner Act that the NLRB was being placed in a statutory "no man's land"
between the AF of L's craft unions and the CIO's industrial unions....
... During its first several years the NLRB accumulated a few powder
burns and the realization that it was the referee in a political scrap between
two powerful labor groups. Id. at 1027.
16 In 1947 Congress for the first and only time offered a guideline for determina-
tion of the appropriate bargaining unit. See Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act) § 101 (b), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 5 159(b) (1964).
The statutory language is quoted in text accompanying note 22 infra.
17 13 N.LR.B. 1255 (1939).
1871 N.L.R.B. 878 (1946).
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history was deemphasized while the relevancy of the craft group's
opportunity for self-determination was emphasized. Also, the
Board at this time was laying special emphasis on the craft group's
maintenance of an identity separate from that of the larger unit. 9
Nevertheless, whatever may have remained of American Can was
dealt a final deathblow in 1947 when the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare criticized the American Can rule as "in-
equitable.,
20
This admonition was reflected in two of the Taft-Hartley
amendments to section 9(b). First, Congress reworded the body of
section 9(b) by deleting the assurance of the employees' "full bene-
fit of their right to self organization" and replacing it with a guar-
antee of the employees' "fullest freedom" in exercising their rights
under the NLRA'
Secondly, in a proviso added -to section 9(b), Congress focused
on the American Can doctrine and handed the Board its first guide-
line in severance cases by stipulating that: "The Board shall not...
decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes as sev-
erance on the ground that a different unit has been established by a
prior Board determination, unless the majority of employees in the
proposed craft unit vote against separate representation."22
Although at face value the new Taft-Hartley amendments
seemed to give a "green light" to craft severance, such a purpose
was dearly not the intention of its cosponsor, Senator Robert A.
Taft,2" and the House's proposal that craft severance be made a man-
l9 See Krislov, Administrative Approaches to Craft Severance, 5 LAB. I.J. 231, 233
(1954).
2 0The following is indicative of Congress' displeasure with that decision:
Since the decision [American Can] ... the Board... has virtually compelled
skilled craftsmen to remain part of a comprehensive plant unit. The commit-
tee regards the application of this doctrine as inequitable. S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1947).
21 Compare § 101(b), 61 Star. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964)
(emphasis added) : "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof .... ." with text accompanying note 5 supra.
22 § 101(b), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
23 Consider the following words of Senator Taft:
It [9(b)] does not go the' full way of giving them [craft units] the absolute
right [to sever] in every case: it simply provides that the Board shall have
discretion and shall not bind itself by previous decision, but that the subject
shall always be open for further consideration by the Board. 93 CONG. REc.
3836 (1947).
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datory right was dropped by the Senate.24 Nevertheless, consider-
able freedom was accorded to craft severability.
Interpretation by the Board of the new subsection 9(b) (2) pro-
viso was soon reached in National Tube Co.,25 where bricklayers
were denied craft severance from the larger representational unit,
in part because of the Board's prior certification of a plantwide unit,
and also because of the high degree of integration of operations in
the basic steel industry. National Tube, through its "integration of
operations" theory, in effect ended craft severance in highly inte-
grated industries, such as basic steel, where the ordinary pattern of
bargaining was industrial. Thus prior bargaining history was only
a factor, but when coupled with something as relevant as the func-
tional coordination of an employer's operations, it outweighed the
right of skilled workers to be separately represented. The National
Tube rule was adopted in subsequent cases involving the basic alu-
minum,26 wet-milling,- and lumber 28 industries. 21
Then, in American Potash & Chemical Corp.,"° the Board re-
24 H.R. REP. No. 353, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
Congressional intention on this point was further clarified in the following dictum:
"The addition of subsection 2 of 9(b) created no ambiguity . . . Congress clearly did
not command the Board, as it could have done, to establish a craft unit whenever re-
quested by a qualified craft union." NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167,
172-73 (4th Cit. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1960). Furthermore, it has been
suggested that Congress tried to avoid alienating either the CIO or the AFL and there-
fore it followed a middle-of-the-road course in craft severance. Rathbun, supra note
15, at 1030.
Finally, one authority has come to the conclusion that Congress, in its zealous effort
to reverse the American Can Co. doctrine, overlooked the International Minerals case
which had modified the earlier decision by placing far less weight on prior history.
Jones, supra note 11, at 316. See also text accompanying note 18 supra.
25 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948). It was the Board's view that Congress had not really
intended to encourage craft severance, but instead only precluded the possibility of auto-
matic denial of severance because of a prior Board unit determination. Id. at 1204 n.11.
2 6 Permanente Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804 (1950). An example of the changes
of position that resulted is contained in the following history by which the aluminum
industry was eventually included in the National Tube type industries: Permanente
Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804 (1950), and Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 119
N.L.R.B. 695 (1957), overruling Reynolds Metal Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 110 (1949). In
Permanente the Board held that the National Tnbe rule restricting craft severance should
be applied to the basic aluminum industry because, like the basic steel industry, it was
"highly integrated." 89 N.L.R.B. at 811. However, severance was allowed where the
operation was not considered to be "basic." Harvey Mach. Co., 114 N.I-R.B. 935
(1955) (manufacturer of aluminum forgings); Revere Copper & Brass Inc., 111
N.L.R.B. 1241 (1955) (aluminum products fabrication); Reynolds Metals Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 721 (1951) (reclamation of aluminum scrap).
27 Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 362 (1949).
28 Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1949).
29 The "integration of operations" doctrine was also applied to production areas
within a larger unit. See Ford Motor Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 887 (1948).
3 0 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
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versed the National Tube interpretation of section 9(b) (2), conclud-
ing that the intent of Congress was to make craft elections man-
datory whenever the group seeking severance was a "true craft"
group, 3 1 and whenever the union representing these employees was
a "traditional representative" of their interests." These standards
were made applicable to all craft severance questions in every indus-
try except in ,the so-called "National Tube industries" (basic steel
and aluminum, wet-milling, and lumber) where, because of the
highly coordinated manufacturing processes involved, a prior Board
certification of a plantwide unit was presumed appropriate. In
short, the American Potash Board enunciated a new two-part doc-
trine for severance determination, but, as a corollary to its new rule,
denied that any retroactive effect be given to its decision by holding
that where National Tubes "integration of operations" theory al-
ready had been applied, no question of severance would be al-
lowed.33
By only inquiring into the identity of the group seeking sever-
ance, and by not considering the appropriateness of splitting up an
existing unit, the Board was looking only at the arguments of the
craftsmen for severance. Under its interpretation of section 9(b)
(2) the American Potash case came closer to giving full weight to
the "fullest freedom" mandate than any previous case. Of course,
as for skilled craftsmen in the National Tube industries, the liber-
ality of the American Potash doctrinal tests did not apply, but this
arbitrary corollary was not seriously challenged. In fact, until re-
cently, the only attack levelled at the American Potash rule came
from the Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 4 in
which the Board's interpretation of section 9(b)(2) was rejected.
The court denied enforcement of the Board's decision because it had
not considered all of the factors relevant to the issue of severance.
Of particular importance to the court was the Board's failure to con-
sider the factors militating against severance.
Except for the court's criticism in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the
American Potash decision remained unchallenged until the Board
31 Id. at 1422. Elements of the "true craft" test are defined in Reyolds Metals Co.,
108 N.L.R.B. 821 (1954); Mathieson Ala. Chem. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 1079 (1952);
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 77 N.LR.B. 719 (1948). Once the particular craft is recog-
nized as "true," all craftsmen in the group are to be included in the unit. Monsanto
Chem. Co., 78 NL-.B. 1249 (1948); Caterpillar Tractor Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 457 (1948).
32 Elements of the "traditional representative" test are set out in Industrial Rayon
Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 514 (1960), enforcement denied, 291 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1961).
33 107 N.LR.B. at 1420.
34270 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 943 (1960).
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in Mallinckrodt Chemical Works"3 reversed its stand, adopted the
Fourth Circuit's reasoning, and then established new standards."0
II. THE NEW RULES
A. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works
It was to redress this arbitrary state of the law and to effectu-
ate a result more within the overall purpose of the NLRA that
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works was decided. In this case the Board
denied craft severance to instrument operators for the following
reasons: their union was not a traditional representative of the em-
ployees' interests, and the workers were integrally connected with
the production processes of the employer. In the interest of labor
stability this smaller unit was not to be carved out of the larger unit.
Through this recent decision the Board effected a vast restructuring
of its standards for determining the appropriate unit for craft sever-
ance from larger, even plantwide, bargaining groups. Henceforth,
the Board will consider all relevant factors such as prior bargaining
history, integration of employer's operations, and workers' commu-
nity of interests, regardless of the industry involved."
The employer Mallinckrodt Chemical Works filed a motion
with the Board for a review of a Regional Director's decision order-
ing an election to determine the severability of 12 instrument me-
chanics from a larger bargaining unit of 280 maintenance and pro-
duction workers. The International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, AFL-CIO, was seeking certification as bargaining repre-
sentative. Upon a rehearing of the facts, the Board found that the
mechanics were a "true craft" group3 8 as defined under the first part
of the American Potash standard. Following a further review of
the factors presented, the Board concluded that the IBEW had not
met the "traditional representative" requirement,' 9 the second part
of the American Potash doctrine. At this juncture the question of
severability could therefore have been answered; craft severance
would be denied because the union was not the ordinary represent-
ative of the mechanics' interests. However, in order to lay the
35 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. a 20, 981 (1966).
6 Id. at 27,169-71.
37Id. at 27,159.
38 Id. at 27,160.
39 Id. at 27,161. Although the facts showed that the IBEW did represent instru-
ment mechanics in other industries, and did provide for craft apprenticeship programs,
the conclusion was inescapable that the primary purpose of these trainee programs was
devoted to preparing electricians and not mechanics.
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foundation for a new policy, the Board treated the union's failure
as not controlling and proceeded to discuss the American Potash
and National Tube doctrines."
There were three untenable conclusions reached in the Ameri-
can Potash decision that the Board sought to correct. First, the
Board stated that the American Potash Board had misconstrued the
meaning of National Tube because the former opinion was "predi-
cated in substantial part on the view that National Tube's construc-
tion of section 9(b) (2) virtually foreclosed discretion and compelled
the Board to grant severance."4 1
A second objection was directed at the two affirmative tests pos-
tulated by American Potash." Under these formulas, coupled with
its erroneous interpretation of National Tube, the Board had been
virtually deprived of its opportunity to scrutinize those policy factors
which could challenge severance. Here the Mallinckrodt Board
was clearly on firm ground, since inquiry under American Potash
was only one sided and the interests of the employer, the other em-
ployees, and the public's concern for maintaining labor stability
were ignored. However, these two "tests" were not completely
emasculated; henceforth they are to be utilized to the extent that
they may be useful in identifying the class of employees seeking
severance and the union claiming representative status. 3 The third
American Potash rule that the Board attacked was the arbitrary
exclusion of craft severance in the "National Tube industries" '44
whereby the Board was to presume a plantwide unit to be appropri-
ate without regard for the legitimate interests of identifiable craft
groups.
In short, Mallinckrodt overturned the American Potash tests be-
cause it was difficult for an alleged craft group not to meet these
qualifications; conversely, the classification of "National Tube in-
dustries" was arbitrary and made craft severance unduly difficult
for skilled workers in the basic steel and aluminum, wet-milling,
and lumber industries. National Tube did not remain unchanged
either; to the extent that that decision limited review of all relevant
factors it was overruled.45
40 Id,
41ld at 27,163. Thus, in light of legislative history the rationale upon which
American Potash was premised was erroneous.
42 For a discussion of these tests, see text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
43 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. at 27,164.
44 For a discussion, see text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
45 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. at 27,165 n.17.
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Dissenting in part, Member Fanning thought that the instru-
ment mechanics should have been granted severance.46  He thought
that the majority was relying too much on the company's 25-year
bargaining history and the highly integrated nature of its operations.
However, in light of the public's interest in preventing a fracturing
of the collective bargaining process into a multiplicity of representa-
tive units the majority's result seems sound. This would appear to
be especially true since the union was not an ordinary representative
of the employees and the only real countervailing interests were
those of the skilled workers.
B. The Companion Cases
Indications of Mallinckrodt's effect upon the interpretation of
severance matters were not long in coming. In the first of two
companion cases decided on the same day, the full Board in E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co." allowed craft severance of 40 electri-
cians from a larger unit of 70 employees. The Board reiterated its
new policy of considering all relevant factors including the interests
of the employer, the employees seeking severance, and those outside
the proposed unit.48
In Holmberg, Inc.,49 the second companion case to Mallinc-
krodt, the Board denied severance to a group of toolroom workers
in the employer's stamping plant for several reasons. First, the
workers' job functions were integrally connected to the production
line processes of the company. Second, and of greater importance,
was the 24 -year bargaining history of the employer on an industrial
basis." The Board considered the workability of the present unit
in light of this prior history and determined that the toolmakers'
interests had not been endangered especially since these workers re-
mained the highest paid employees in the unit.5  Apparently the
Board was advancing a notion that the parties seeking severance
46 Id. at 27,169-70.
47 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 20,982 (1966).
48 By way of comparison it is interesting to note that several conditions for meeting
the Mallinckrodt standards are mentioned. (1) The employer's highly integrated man-
ufacturing process is important regardless of the rule of American Potash. Compare
Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 20,981, at 27,159 (1966),
with E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 20,982, at 27,174
(1966). (2) The ability of the members of the craft group to perform their duties
independently from other fellow employees. Id. at 27,172-73.
49 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 20,983 (1966).
50 To this particular point, Member Fanning took exception. Id. at 27,179.
51id. at 27,177.
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must defeat a rebuttable presumption that a present unit is appro-
priate when it appears on the record that this established bargaining
unit has fairly recognized the interests of all those whom it has rep-
resented. Relatively high wages would be a valid indication that a
group had been adequately represented by a larger bargaining unit.
Also mentioned, but not discussed at length, was the fact that Holm-
berg was a one-building operation with only one story of floor-
space.' Thus the workers' community of interests, for example,
their common access to plant facilities, were not only similar but
probably identical.
Ill. THE POST-MALLINCKRODT CASES
The basic purpose of the NLRA is the promotion and mainte-
nance of labor relations stability and the Board, through its "weigh-
ing of all relevant factors" test as enunciated in Mallinckrodt, has
now taken a significant step toward that end by proposing a work-
able standard for determining craft severability. There are, how-
ever, several points that will require further clarification; namely,
what are the relevant factors and, more importantly, what degree
of importance may be accorded to each one? The following section
will examine the cases decided since Mallinckrodt in an effort to
answer these questions.
A. In Search of Relevant Factors
(1) True Craft Group.-Since attainment of true craft status
involves some formal or informal training, the Board looks not only
to apprenticeship programs," but also to craftlike specialization ac-
quired through work experience." Also considered is the time re-
quired -to develop proficiency in a skilled job. Of course, lack of
an apprentice training program may be a key consideration in deny-
ing severance, especially where the skills themselves are not gener-
ally considered as apprenticeable. "5
(2) Traditional Representative.-The traditional representa-
52 Id. at 27,176-77. This interpretation could render craft severance in the smaller
plants more difficult. There is precedent to the effect that dose proximity in the plant
is not weighed if other factors are equal, for example, that there is a true craft involved.
See B.H. Hadley, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1622, 1625-26 (1961).
53 See Bunker Hill Co., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,517 (1967).
54 See Bell Tel. Labs., Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,367 (1967).
55 See Potlatch Forests, Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,575 (1967); Pervel Indus.,
Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. ! 21,252 (1967).
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tive test" depends on numerous criteria, the most often mentioned
being whether the union has a history of representing such workmen
and is not merely trying to expand its jurisdiction. 7 Here the
Board focuses specifically on the past record of the union's repre-
sentation of similar craftsmen. 8 Of course, due weight is given to
a new organization if it is created for the express purpose of repre-
senting these skilled workers.5"
However, in Aerojet-General Corp."° the Board, while recogniz-
ing a tool- and diemaker's union as a traditional representative of
employees in the tool and die craft, denied severance of Aerojet's
diemakers from the larger plantwide unit represented by the United
Steel Workers because the latter had represented the bargaining
unit since 1951, and there had been a certain stability attained over
this period. It bears repeating that the traditional representative
test is important insofar as identifying the organization seeking sev-
erance of skilled tradesmen, but it may not have much positive value
when other factors, such as a stable bargaining history, are present.
(3) Prior Bargaining History.-Perhaps no other factor rele-
vant to the issue of severability has as much importance as a past
history of stable industrial relations. This is only proper for in a
sense it rewards management and the incumbent union for their
collective efforts in achieving labor relations stability while, at the
same time, admonishing the upstart organization for disturbing this
relationship. The post-Mallinckrodt cases reflect this sensitivity to-
wards past history. A typical example is the Board's recent Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co. decision"' denying severance to Goodyear's
electricians located in plants throughout the country. The Board
also turned down an alternative suggestion that the severed unit in-
dude electricians at only 16 of the Goodyear establishments. Of
pivotal importance to the Board's determination was that for 28
5 6 Note 32 supra.
57 See, e.g., Jay Kay Metal Specialties Corp., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,206
(1967).
58 Id. An IBEW request for severance of instrument repairmen and powerhouse
operators was turned down because of the union's failure to show it represented these
departmental groups. Bunker Hill Co., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,514 (1967).
59 American Bosch Arma Corp., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,195 (1967). The
fact that the "union" petitioning for severance had no constitution, by-laws, nor history
of representing any employees in collective bargaining did not detract from its "labor
organization" status under § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1964). However, the Board
noted, in light of this record, the organization had hardly enhanced its standing as a
traditional craft representative. 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. at 27,564.
60 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,242 (1967).
1 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,449 (1967).
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years all of the employer's 20,000 workers had been included in a
multiplant production and maintenance unit. Furthermore, Good-
year and the incumbent union had engaged in companywide nego-
tiations for over 20 years with special provisions in each bargaining
agreement for craft employees." In light of this prior record the
Board was constrained to "carve out" the electrical craftsmen from
the existing unit. Reluctance to disturb a stable bargaining record
is especially evident in cases where the Board is petitioned by a craft
union for severance of craftsmen from a multiplant unit solely rep-
resented by one unit."
In conclusion, it appears that past history is probably the most
important of all the factors relevant to craft severability. Under-
standably, it has become a threshold inquiry that the Board must
take into consideration; in fact, the Board even makes special note
of the absence of prior bargaining history in many of the post-
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works cases."4
(4) Community of Interest.-In each plant there may exist a
certain similarity of working conditions, wages, benefit plans, job
promotion procedures, and other incidental subjects of collective
bargaining which are shared by all of the employees. This com-
mon denominator of working conditions and terms of employment
is referred -to as the employees' community of interest.65 Because
this community may include a wide variety of employee interests,
it is expected that, as a standard, community of interest is rather
elastic when applied in craft severance cases. Often a community
of interest results after the plant or bargaining unit has acquired
a pattern of representation or, in other words, after a history of la-
bor relations stability has developed. Therefore, common interests
would seem to be a natural outgrowth of the crystalization of labor-
management relations.
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.66 the Board noted that fringe
benefits were similar for all employees throughout the Goodyear en-
terprise and thus constituted a point of common interest which could
be upset if severance were allowed. Another important element of
62Id. at 27,959-61.
63 See, e.g,, id.
6 4 Doubleday & Co., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,467 (1967); Martin Theatres,
Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 9 21,422 (1967); Kimball Systems, Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB
Dec. 5 21,301 (1967); Manpower, Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 9 21,297 (1967).
6 5 Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance Between Stable La-
bor Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 W. RES. L. REv, 479 (1967).
66 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. S 21,449 (1967).
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the community of interest criteria, bumping procedure, arose in the
Aerojet-General Corp. decision.67 If the existing unit were gerry-
mandered and another bargaining agent recognized, different job
security provisions with regard to layoff and callback practices
could be introduced, thus causing jurisdictional lines to be drawn
between rival unions. For the employer and the employee such a
result would mean that job interchange and promotion would be
disrupted, and seniority rights arbitrarily terminated. It was pre-
cisely these considerations that prompted the Board in American
Bosch Arma Corp.68 to deny severance to toolroom employees. In
particular, recognition of a new union for these employees would
have effectuated at least one undesirable result; namely, employees
who possessed skills similar to those of the tool- and dieworkers, but
who were outside the proposed craft unit, would have been denied
promotion through the established merit program.69 Likewise, in
Dura-Containers, Inc.,7° a Teamster's severance petition was turned
down because the Board found that the proposed truckdriver group
lacked "separate interests" different from the overall community of
interests shared by the existing bargaining unit. Here all employees
were paid roughly the same wages, were entitled to the same fringe
benefits, and had the same chance to bid for jobs.7'
Situations exist where the skilled workers do maintain an iden-
tity separate from the present industrial group. In ruling that tool-
and diemakers' interests had not been "submerged" in the produc-
tion unit's community of bargaining interests, the Board, in Jay
Kay Metal Specialties Corp.,72 focused on the plantwide agreement
which accorded separate wage classifications and other conditions of
employment to the toolroom employees. In this case severance was
granted despite a 13-year history of industrial representation. Ar-
riving at a similar result in Mc-Mor-Han Trucking Co.73 the Board
noted a difference in job classifications, hours of employment, and
overtime practices applicable to drivers and mechanics.
Finally, to emphasize the elasticity of the community of interests
the recent St. John's Associates, Inc. case74 should be mentioned.
67 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,242 (1967).
68 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,195 (1967).
69 Id. at 27,563-64.
70 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,299 (1967).
71 Id. at 27,734-35.
72 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,206 (1967).
73 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,609 (1967).
74 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,595 (1967).
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There the Board mentioned, among other things, the fact that the
truckdrivers seeking severance wore uniforms more often than did
other employees, especially the dispatchers.75
(5) Integration of Operations.-A final factor considered here
is the employer's functional coordination of operations.76 While
at one time this factor was dispositive of the issue of craft severance
in certain industries under the National Tube doctrine,7" this factor,
in the new post-Mallinckrodt Chemical Works cases, is clearly not
determinative." In addition it is worthwhile to mention that, in
general, the relative physical proximity of employees in the plant is
important to a finding of functional integration of operations.79
Similarly, employee interchange and common supervision, while
sometimes considered separately, or under community of interests,"
are treated here because it is basic to employee interchange and uni-
tary supervision that the employer's operations be technically so-
phisticated enough to permit such practices.
Generally, the more interchange between employees in the pro-
posed craft unit and production and maintenance workmen, the less
likelihood there is for severance."1 To the same effect is the degree
of job assignment cooperation required. " Thus, it is detrimental to
a showing of severability if skilled employees, such as toolmakers,
must, in order to perform their duties, coordinate their activities
with production and maintenance workers. This concept of "team-
work" was considered in Alton Box Board Co. 3 where the Board
denied severance to electricians because the latter were part of a
'"troubleshooting" team which included pipefitters, machinists, mill-
wrights, and production and maintenance workers. Just as the pro-
posed severance group's craft status may be diluted by the need for
cooperation with less skilled employees, so also, automation may re-
duce the craft characteristics of the subgroup of the skilled workers.
Employee interchange and common supervision often occur to-
75Id. at 28,194.
7 6 See Hall, supra note 65, at 493.
77 See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
7 8 See, eg., Timber Prods. Co., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,407, at 27,904-05
(1967).
79 See, e.g., Neil Amana Food Serv., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,144, at 27,477
(1967). See also Holmberg, Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 20,983 (1966).
80 Hall, supra note 65, at 486-97.
81 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 9 21,449, at 27,959
(1967).
8 2 See Boyden Logging, Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 9 21,401 (1967).
83 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 9 21,386 (1967).
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gether as a natural consequence of a highly mechanized industrial
operation. No definitive percentage of time spent away from the
skilled worker's regular job has been formulated as determinative
by the Board. In two recent Teamster casesu severance was denied
to truck operators who were occupied in noncraft activities from 5
to 25 percent and from 25 to 35 percent of the time respectively.
In conclusion, the present practice affords the advantage of ad-
ministrative flexibility 
- the relevant factors, either in favor of,
or against craft severance, are necessarily determined on a case-by-
case basis.85 Nevertheless, there is a measure of reliance placed
on the Board's rulings, and therefore the need for some decisional
uniformity is desireable.86 Specifically, with the likelihood that
8 4 Boyden Logging, Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,401 (1967); Dura-Con-
tainers, Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,299 (1967).
85 On the applicability of stare decisis to its decisions the Board said:
The Board must hold fast to the objectives of the statute using an empirical
approach to adjust its decisions to the evolving realities of industrial progress
and the reflection of that change in organizations of employees. To be effec-
tive for that purpose, each unit determination must have a direct relevancy
to the circumstances within which collective bargaining is to take place.
While many factors may be common to most situations, in an evolving in-
dustrial complex the effect of any one factor, and therefore the weight to be
given it in making the unit determination, will vary from industry to industry
and from plant to plant. We are therefore convinced that collective-bargain-
ing units must be based upon all the relevant evidence in each individual
case. American Cynamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 909, 911 (1961).
86 Although experience will probably show that craft severance will be denied more
frequently, problems may arise in the future because the Board has denied severance to
several craftlike employee groups. Many unions and employee organizations have not
been heard from yet and when they seek severance, the questions which the Board has
faced in the last few months in applying the "all relevant factors" doctrine may be
multiplied in the near future. Millwrights, for instance, have been a traditional craft
group, but they have been included with machinists in larger unit groups. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1567 (1958); General Elec. Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 637
(1957); American Can Co., 110 N.L.R3.. 1640 (1954). It would seem obvious that
with the overruling of Amnerican Potash and the so-called "National Tube industries"
limitation, greater latitude for granting severance in the basic steel and aluminum in-
dustries will be allowed. Therefore, millwrights in these industries will probably seek
severance from larger units composed of machinists. Likewise, crane operators, numer-
ous in all four of the "National Tube industries," have been denied severance where
they were arbitrarily classified as production workers. International Paper Co., 94
N.L.R.B. 483 (1951).
In the relatively new atomic energy industry the very sophisticated nature of the
manufacturing process has limited severance, although the Board has never formally
included this industry in the National Tube rule. See Carbide & Carbon Chem. Co.,
102 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1953). Under Mallinckrodt greater opportunity for severance
may be allowed. Although already recognized as craftsman, boilermakers, see Standard
Oil Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1957); carpenters, see Kennecott Copper Corp., 138
N.L.R.B. 118 (1962); and auto mechanics, see Kennecott Copper Corp., 125 N.L.R.B.
107 (1959); Diamond T. Utah, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 966 (1959), may strive for sep-
aration from more expansive units in the highly integrated industries. Likewise, the
previous denial of severance may be challenged in the typewriter, see Royal McBee Corp.
v. NLRB, 302 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1962); and wet-milling, see Corn Prods. Ref. Co.,
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severance will be denied in the future, the relative weight assigned
to each of the relevant factors should be postulated. Also, con-
tained within the relevant factors are interesting counterarguments
which will be discussed below. Finally, it is not suggested that
the Board adopt a formula, for any easy equation balancing compet-
ing interests would undoubtedly lead to arbitrary results.8" Rather,
the purpose of this present discussion is merely to present the prob-
lems inherent in each of the relevant factors.
B. The Relevant Factors UPon. Closer Examination
A common reason assigned to a finding that the proposed unit
is not a true craft group is the lack of an apprenticeship program. 8
Yet it may be that some plan for offering specialized training is war-
ranted because of the employer's continued introduction of complex
machinery. Likewise, the employees themselves may justifiably see
the need for such specialization in order to insure their own safety.
This necessity may be real or imagined and, likewise, the employer's
resistance to it may be well or ill founded, but the fact remains that
only through severance from the indifferent industrial unit may the
skilled employees be able to exert enough pressure at the bargaining
table to institute an apprenticeship program. Of course, the Board
looks to the existence of a craft training program and not to the
reasons why there is not one, and this inquiry is not unfair. How-
ever, lack of an apprenticeship program may be a valid indication
that separate representation is advisable.
The assertion that a union petitioning for severance has not met
the traditional representative test has another side. If attention
were focused on the incumbent union's credentials, reasons for the
proposed severance might appear better grounded. For instance, a
plantwide unit at a chemical manufacturing establishment being
represented by the United Mine Workers (UMW)8" seems unlikely.
Similarly, employees of a manufacturer of clothespressing machines
represented on an industrial basis by the UMW"° seems most untra-
80 N.L.R.B. 362 (1948), industries. Note, however, that dry-milling never was con-
sidered a "National Tube industry." See Kellogg Co., 104 N.LR.B. 302 (1953).
87 The impracticality of such a suggestion has long been recognized. Mueller Brass
Co. v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 402, 404 (D.C. Cit. 1950).
S8 See, e.g., Potlatch Forests, Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,575 (1967); Kim-
ball Syss., Inc, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. g 21,301 (1967); Aerojet-General Corp., 1967
CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,242 (1967).
SOSee Allied Chem. Corp., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,455 (1967).
O°Paris'Mfg. Co., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 9 21,238 (1967).
Of course, this remark is not meant to totally overlook the industrial nature of the
ULMW, or the prowess of its late leader, John L. Lewis.
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ditional. Likewise, in a recent case,91 the Machine Printers and En-
gravers were denied severance of textile machine operators from an
industrial unit represented by the Teamsters. With respect to the
Teamsters, it must be remembered that for about 20 years it has
been their policy to organize whole industrial units and not to limit
themselves to a unit of truckdrivers and helpers.9"
In looking to the traditional representative status of the peti-
tioning union, the Board should perhaps also consider the incum-
bent union's tradition for representing the workers proposing sever-
ance.9" Naturally, these skilled employees may have opted for an
industrial unit originally, but with the introduction of new manu-
facturing processes and the like, the appeal for separate representa-
tion may be greater and more justifiable.
Another problem arises when the Board finds a community of
interest among the employees because they share similar working
conditions, rates of pay, and fringe benefits. The point has not been
raised, but it would appear worthy of inquiry to ask whether this
similarity of treatment is not the reason why skilled workers want
severance. That is, a skilled group may feel that they are entitled
to a larger portion of the monetary benefits than that to which they
are presently entitled. Therefore, when the Board says that sever-
ance is to be denied because of the skilled group's submergence "in
[a] broader community of interests,"" is not this in fact denying the
possibility that the skilled group's individual interests are being
slighted?
Community of interest, as stated above,95 is a concept that per-
mits conceptual elasticity; it may include as many interests as the
Board finds common to all the industrial unit's employees. The
outer limits appear to have no boundaries.
As stated before, functional integration and employee inter-
change with less skilled employees are often relied upon to show
community of interest and yet this may be a reason why a skilled
group would prefer separate recognition and why they would rather
9 1 Pervel Indus., Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,252 (1967).
92 In 1949, Dave Beck, then executive vice president of the Teamsters, announced
that his union would commence organizing on an industrial basis. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15,
1949, at 9, col. 3.
93 This is not to suggest that the Board has been unresponsive to charges of unfair
representation.
94 See North Am. Aviation, Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,063 (1967).
95 See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
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have their own helpers assist them rather than the production and
maintenance employees.
Finally, there is -the matter of prior bargaining history. Reluc-
tance to carve up a bargaining unit that has a history of stable rela-
tions with management is understandable." However, automation
and even normal production innovations may bring changes which
did not exist years before when the incumbent union was certified.
The fact that the industrial unit has remained intact may mean that
the interests of the proposed group are so "submerged" that sever-
ance, even if warranted, would not be practical. There is, how-
ever, less danger of this occurrence because under the Mallinckrodt
Chemical Works doctrine prior bargaining history is only one con-
sideration, but the danger of falling back on this factor as the pri-
mary concern has not gone unnoticed.97
In conclusion, the above discussion is not offered as an attack
on the Board's new doctrine, but rather it is merely presented to il-
lustrate that factors which at first glance appear to militate against
severance, may in fact support it.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Board, through Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, definitely
reached an equitable result in attempting to resolve the craft sever-
ance muddle. Now all employee groups will be subject to the same
examination when the severance issue arises; and the factors deemed
relevant in such an inquiry are supposedly the same in each case.
The problem, of course, is defining the factors and, more impor-
tantly, determining their relative weight without being mechanistic.
Stability in industrial relations is always the goal in all unit de-
termination situations and this most important fact will not be ob-
scured. Undoubtedly, severance shall be more difficult in the fu-
ture. However, there remains the task of satisfying the employee's
freedom to choose his own bargaining representative while safe-
guarding stability. Perhaps a workable solution that would permit
the maximum freedom allowable to skilled artisans, while prot6ct-
9 6 See Timber Prods. Co., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,407 (1967). The Board
denied craft severance to a group petitioning through the IBEW and noted that in its
decision industrial bargaining "has been conducive to a substantial degree of stability in
labor relations." Id. at 27,905.
9 7 Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. g 20,981, at 27,169.
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ing industrial tranquility, is the newly proposed coordinated or
unity"8 bargaining approach.
Through the unity bargaining process employer associations and
coalitions of unions negotiate on an industrywide basis. Conceiv-
ably, this system has the merit of tolerating a proliferation of em-
ployee units while, at the same time, safeguarding the employer
from the onerous task of dealing with each union separately. As a
means of reducing interunion rivalry, voluntary arbitration might be
utilized to reduce the nuisance of a maverick union's holdingout
tactics.
JOHN M. FLYNN
"
8 Bernard Cushman, Special Assistant to the General Counsel of the NLRB, pro-
posed "unity bargaining" in a speech entitled "Paradoxes in Labor-Management Rela-
tions" delivered in New Orleans last October. Although Mr. Cushman's talk was
directed primarily to the finding of an alternative to compulsory arbitration, the unity
approach has special relevance here for the problems of contract negotiation are inter-
twined with unit determination questions. 1967 CCH LAB. L. REP. 5 8097.
